December
22nd,
2016
You can find it here.
And here's the abstract: Local and national effects in the electoral cycle: the case of Italy, 2001–2009. Territory, Politics, Governance. According to electoral cycle theory, in second-order elections small parties are expected to improve their performance, while big parties are expected to be punished. This paper formally tests whether these electoral cycle effects can be considered as solely national in nature or whether they vary at the local level. It tests the expectations in Northern Italy in two electoral cycles (2001–2004 and 2008–2009), with special reference to Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia/PdL and the smaller ally, Lega Nord. The paper analyses electoral outcomes at the municipality level with spatial analysis techniques (Moran’s I and spatial autoregressive model), showing that parties’ support seems to follow a local electoral cycle, partly independent from the aggregate one.
And here's the abstract: Local and national effects in the electoral cycle: the case of Italy, 2001–2009. Territory, Politics, Governance. According to electoral cycle theory, in second-order elections small parties are expected to improve their performance, while big parties are expected to be punished. This paper formally tests whether these electoral cycle effects can be considered as solely national in nature or whether they vary at the local level. It tests the expectations in Northern Italy in two electoral cycles (2001–2004 and 2008–2009), with special reference to Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia/PdL and the smaller ally, Lega Nord. The paper analyses electoral outcomes at the municipality level with spatial analysis techniques (Moran’s I and spatial autoregressive model), showing that parties’ support seems to follow a local electoral cycle, partly independent from the aggregate one.
